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1 Introduction
In this work we begin to explore some aggregate dynamic properties of demand patterns
when preferences are shaped by the cognitive structures of consumers and evolve in socially
embedded fashions.
A while ago, one of the authors of this paper witnessed at a seminar the horror of most
colleagues when Werner Hildebrand, presenting some further development on his theory
of demand (Hildebrand (1994)) provocatively suggested more or less that “preferences and
choices are matters for psychiatrists and not for economists”, while the task of the latter
should be primarily to establish some statistical conditions under which basic propositions
of economic theory – such as downward sloping demand curves etc. – hold in the aggregate,
in presence of heterogeneous, and possibly “irrational” consumers. In a nutshell, the
provocation highlights, first of all, a major divide cutting across the economic discipline –
as well as other social sciences –, namely, how seriously should one take standard utility
theory (with or without its more recent refinements) and the associated “rational” theory
of decision making as the foundation of a descriptive theory of demand? (Another major
problem concerns the aggregate properties of diverse demand schedules, no matter how
constructed: we shall come to that below.)
Needless to say, the majority of the economic profession seems to take that type of
microeconomic foundations of decisions very seriously indeed, entrenched as they are with
deep (“anthropological”) views on the nature of “rationality” and self-seeking behaviours,
passed through successive generations via conventional teaching tools such as “indifference
curves” and the like, and further justified by their purported role in bridging descriptive
and normative analyses (welfare theorems, etc.). However, admittedly minority views in
economics (but nearly “mainstream” in other social disciplines) claim that classic decision
theory has little to offer by way of the interpretation of what people actually do and
that one should turn in fact to cognitive and social psychology, sociology (and, why not,
psychiatry) in order to derive empirically sound theories of how people behave and choose
the way they do.
Note that the appeal to inductive generalizations – in this perspective – does not con-
cern solely the nature and origins of preferences (which could, as such, nicely complement
rather than upset “rational” decision-theoretic views: after all, in the latter, as reminded
by Stigler and Becker (1977), de gustibus non est disputandum . . . ). More profoundly, it
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relates to both the procedures by which decisions are taken and the interactions (possibly
at a collectively level) between decisions, outcomes and preferences themselves.
First, at a procedural level, as Legrenzi, Girotto and Johnson-Laird (1993) put it,
“the classical theory of decision-making, whatever its status as a specifica-
tion of rationality, does not begin to explain the mental processes underlying
decisions . . .On the one hand, the theory is radically incomplete: it has noth-
ing to say about when one should decide to make a decision, or how one should
determine the range of options, or how one should assess the utilities of various
outcomes. On the other hand, the theory conflicts with the evidence on how
people reach decisions in daily life” (Legrenzi et al. (1993) pp.37–8).
The literature on these subject is immense: see, among others, Slovic (1990), Payne,
Bettman and Johnson (1992), Tversky and Kahneman (1986), Thaler (1992)1 In eco-
nomics, as known, the emphasis on the “bounds” of rationality, and the related analytical
requirement, so to speak, to “open up the cognitive blackbox”, has found a good deal of in-
spiration in the path-breaking work of Herbert Simon (Simon ((1959), (1986) amd (1988)).
Indeed, the empirical departures from the canonic procedures prescribed by rational de-
cision theory are likely to be even deeper than those envisaged by Simon, in that human
agents might not only be bound away from “substantive” rationality, but often display
also systematic biases in the procedures themselves for judgment and choice.2 Moreover,
as Shafir, Simonson and Tversky (1993) conclude, also on the grounds of the cited Payne
et al. (1992),
“in contrast to classical theory that assumes stable values and preferences, it appears
that people often do not have well-established values, and that preferences are actually
constructed – not merely revealed – during their elicitation . . . ” (Shafir et al. (1993),
p. 34).3
Finally, the literature on cognitive dissonance reveals another, symmetric, source of
endogeneity of preferences, namely the post-decisional adjustment of goals in order to
rationalize counterintentional behaviours and outcomes (Fastinger (1956), Wicklund and
Brehm (1976), and for an economic application Akerlof and Dickens (1982)).
All this lato sensu “cognitive” evidence suggest that, yes, we should primarily call in
psychologists rather than decision-theorists in order to explain goal-formation, deliberation
and choice.
Second, other pieces of evidence hint that we should call in social psychologists and soci-
ologists, too. More precisely, one find widespread occurrences of social endogeneity of pref-
erences, including social imitation, formation of relatively homogeneous “lifestyles” within
specific social groups, “snob effects”, authority-induced changes in values and choices, and
many others. (A thorough discussion of a few of these issues with respect to consumption
patterns is in Earl (1986)). Relatedly, within an enormous literature, see also, e.g. Mil-
gram (1974), Maital and Maital (1993), Hirshman (1965), Kuran (1987), all the way to
the suggestive conjectures on the historical dynamics of social adaptation and rebellion in
Moore (1978)).
In these domains, T. Veblen is one of the outstanding early contributors of plenty of
conjectures and ‘appreciative theories’ (for too long unjustly neglected, notwithstanding
1A rather balanced assessment of the merits and limitations of standard utility theory from an economist
point of view is in Shoemaker (1982).
2One discusses some of them with an eye on their implications for evolutionary theories of learning in
economics in Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo (1996).
3See also Tversky and Simonson (1994).
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their, sometimes irritating, analytical fuzziness) 4 cf. Veblen (1899) and (1919) (And,
later, along somewhat similar lines, Duesenberry (1949),. Leibenstein (1950) and (1976);
see also Katona (1975) and (1980)).
As already mentioned, it is worth recalling the caveat that under certain conditions
the endogeneity of preferences as such does not pose any overwhelming challenge to stan-
dard decision theory. That includes those circumstances whereby, (a) the time-scale of
preference evolution is of orders of magnitude greater than the time-scale of decisions
themselves (so that, for example, the ‘disutility of eating pork’ might have evolved over
millenia, but for all practical purposes that can be taken as a given and stable prefer-
ence trait of any practising Jew or Muslim while selecting meat . . . ); (b) preferences are
not context-dependent, so that, in James March’s language, they fulfil the conventional
“logic of consequences” rather than a “logic of appropriateness” (. . . ‘what is appropriate
to do for anyone with my identity and my social role in those circumstances? . . . ’) (cf.
March (1994)); (c) future changes in preferences are fully anticipated by forward-looking
intertemporally utility maximizers (cf. Becker (1976));5 and (d) the collective distribu-
tions of preferences, at each time, are not among the arguments of individual decision
algorithms (i.e. . . . “like to do what my neighbours do” . . . etc.). Here and throughout,
we refer to ‘social endogeneity’ to mean those circumstances – in our view, quite frequent
indeed – whereby those conditions are violated.
The two sets of evidence related, broadly speaking, first, to the cognitive and be-
havioural processes of choice, and, second, to their social embeddedness – strongly militate
in favour of inductively disciplined theories of microeconomic behaviours, in general, and
– as far as this work is concerned – final consumption, in particular, grounded into the rel-
evant ‘phenomenological’ generalizations drawn from e.g. cognitive and social psychology,
sociology, etc. It is a view certainly shared by those breeds of economists who might label
themselves “behaviorist”, “institutionalist” and “evolutionary” (for quite germane devel-
opments of this argument, Nelson and Winter (1982), Coriat and Dosi (1995), Hodgson
(1988), and Earl (1986)).6
However, even granted all that (a point by no means uncontroversial among economists),
why should we not let this domain of micro investigation to psychologists, sociologists
(and psychiatrists), and limit our attention as economists to much more general, and, so
to speak, “minimal” statistical restrictions on the characteristics of the populations of e.g.
consumers which are sufficient for aggregate propositions on demand patterns to hold?7 If
4Consider for example the following citation from Veblen (1919):
An adequate theory of economic conduct, even for statical purposes must be drawn
in terms of the individual simply – as in the case of the marginal-utility economics
– . . . since the response that goes to make up human conduct takes place under in-
stitutional norms and only under stimuli that have an institutional bearing . . . The
phenomena of human life occurs only as phenomena of the life of a group or community
. . .Not only is the individual conduct hedged about and directed by his abstract rela-
tions to his fellow in his group, but these relations, being of no institutional character,
vary as the institutional xxx basics” (Veblen (1919), p. 242).
5cf. Sid Winter (1996) who tries to derive “endogenous” preferences from a sort of invariant “meta-
utility functions”.
6We must admit that we came across the latter quite late through the work leading to this paper
– finding many overlapping points of view, and benefiting enormously from his thorough discussion of
consumption theory and evidence. Significant parts of the argument which follows has been improved and
refined drawing on that source.
7Of course, matter would look in any case quite different in fields like marketing or applied industrial
economics, but for the time being we shall confine our discussion to those more general properties of
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we understand correctly, this is the perspective underlying the pioneering works of Trockel
(1984) and especially Hildebrand (1994), whereby one attempts to establish the require-
ments for e.g. aggregate shapes of demand curves as functions of prices, entirely disposing
of dubious psychological constructs based on “utilities”, etc. and explicitly overcoming
the aggregation problems undermining the extrapolation of the purported behaviour of
single consumers to pseudo behavioural entities like “the representative agent”.8
In this approach, one is entirely agnostic on the ways preferences are formed (and
whether they obey the consistency requirements of standard decision theories): rather,
distributional invariances, together with budget constraints account for the aggregate pat-
terns one is meant to explain.9 We do indeed believe that this is a highly promising route
which one is just beginning to investigate. However, we also believe that the ‘agnosticism’
on behavioural microfoundations can go only part of the way in explaining observed “styl-
ized facts” on demand. First, the question why distributions of revealed preferences are
what they are seem to us an interesting one in its own right. Second, one might wonder
how and when those distributions change – under the influence of e.g. introduction of
new products, social interactions, etc. – and what implications all this bear in terms of
aggregate demand properties. Note that both points are likely to be particularly rele-
vant when one increases the number of empirical phenomena one tries to account for, e.g.
in addition to the question of why demand schedule tend to be downward sloping, one
investigates, together, the determinants of diffusion patterns of new commodities, the con-
ditions of occurence of Engel-type demand profiles over time, or – even more complicated
– the emergence of particular “norms of consumptions” within population of consumers
or subgroup of them.
It is in these domains where we see a profound complementarity between behaviourally
parsimonious statistical approaches – a´ la Hildebrand –, on the one hand, and constructive
micro theories in a “Simonesque” and “Veblenesque” spirit, which indeed build upon what
cognitive scientists, sociologists and tell us on choices and behaviours, on the other. In
order to build that bridge, of course, a quite difficult task is to construct microfounded
models which respect the spirit of the behavioural findings and, at the same time, are
“abstract” enough as to generate stylized statistical properties of the ensuing aggregate
demand profiles. This is indeed what we shall begin to do in the following.
Some disclaimers are in order. We are fully aware that the model we shall present is
likely to be considered by empirically minded practitioners too much of a rape of the in-
tricacies of consumers’ behaviour, and, conversely, fare too complicated by theory-inclined
readers: consider it just as a preliminary attempt within a largely unexplored field. The
basic rationale of the exercise is to show how social processes of “preference learning”
and innovation, in presence of stochastically growing incomes, can generate patterns of
demand, and also patterns diffusion of new goods, statistically similar to those empirically
observed. We are far from claiming that, by that token, this is “explaining” the evi-
dence. More modestly, take it as an ‘exercise in plausibility”, whereby, nothwithstanding
heroic modeling assumptions, a few observed statistical properties of consumption can be
constructively generated on foundations building on heterogeneous agents who are much
demand which one typically finds in any intermediate economics textbook.
8The fundamental inconsistencies of such a notion have been thoroughly discussed by Kirman (1989)
and (1991). One of the points, among others, is that, even admitting individual maximizers, with well
behaved utility functions, etc. aggregation does not carry over any restriction on the shape of the aggregate
demand functions (i.e. the demand functions attributed to the “representative agent”) without further
ad hoc assumptions on the nature of preferences themselves. Complementarily, on the lack of ismorphism
between micro-behavioural rules and aggregate dynamics of the corresponding time-series, cf. Lippi (1988).
9An early modeling attempt to derive the sign of demand adjustments to price changes solely from
budget constraints is in Sanderson (1974).
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less “rational” and much more social than in standard theories, and, who discover collec-
tively “along the way” what they like and what they demand within a growing universe
of available commodities.
In section (ii) we shall outline what, we suggest, are major building blocks of an
evidence-disciplined theory of consumption behaviours. In many respects, they constitute
ideal requirements for models still well down the road. Yet, they might be useful yardsticks
for all those who do not buy into M. Friedman-type cavalier epistomology (. . . anything
goes in terms of assumptions, provided that they turn out to somehow work in terms
of predictions . . . ). Section (iii) introduces some modeling tools, including a modified
version of Genetic Algorithms (drawing from John Holland (1975)), through which we try
to capture in a highly simplified form the structures of preferences and their evolution over
time. On these bases, we develop our model of consumption dynamics. Next, we study
some statistical properties of demand generated through computer simulation (section
iv). In the conclusions (section (v)), we also briefly hint at possible further developments
toward “institutionalists” foundations of demand theory.
2 Toward a Descriptive Theory of Consumption: Some Build-
ing Blocks
It is obviously impossible to provide here any fair account of the diverse pieces of evidence
on the processes leading to consumption choices: a whole book would not be enough
to adequately cover the findings, from marketing to cognitive sciences . . . (See anyhow
Earl (1986) for an ambitious overview and interpretation, and Robertson and Kassarjian
(1991)).10 Here, we shall just try to abstract some properties which appear sufficiently
general to be candidate as building blocks also for modeling efforts.
1. Consumption acts (as well as other economic behaviours) are nested into cognitive
categories and ‘mental models’ of the actors.
As argued at some greater length in Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo (1996), any theory
of choice, behaviour and learning in complex and changing environments is most likely
bound at some point to take explicitly on board the cognitive structures by which people
frame the interpretations of their experience and their expectations. And consumption
activities are no exception. Painstakingly, works from cognitive and social psychology and
artificial sciences including Holland et al. (1986), Tversky and Kahneman (1986), Lakoff
(1987), Johnson-Laird (1983) and (1993), Goffman (1974) are making timid inroads into
economics; and, with reference to consumption theory, Earl (1986) makes extensive use
of Kelly’s Personal Construct Psychology (Kelly (1955)) and Steinbrunner’s “cybernetic”
approach (Steinbrunner (1974)). Notwithstanding the enormous diversity across these
cited approaches, it seems to us, what they have in common for our rudimentary purposes
is the general acknowledgement of the importance of diverse and possibly evolving mental
models, cognitive categories and ‘frames’ shaping perception and deliberation.
2. The relationships between ‘mental models’, preferences and consumption behaviours
are to some extent implicit and, possibly, also partly inconsistent with each other.
The fact that ‘models’ provide a structure through which people “make sense” of what
they do (and, together, what they want) is likely to entail the emergence and reproduction
of recognizable lifestyles (cf. Earl (1986)). However, these structures tend to be fuzzy
and ridden with inconsistencies in terms of both actual choices and mapping between
the latter and perceived goals (cognitive dissonance relates precisely to this phenomenon).
10This section which follows has benefitted a lot also for the insightful survey (unfortunately only avail-
able in Italian) on the evidence from the marketing and consumer behaviour literature by Devetag (1995).
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Conflicting preference structures and criteria for choice might precariously (and sometimes
painfully) coexist within the same agent.
‘Models’ offer satisficing inferential machineries for choice (Legrenzi et al. (1993),
Johnson-Laird (1993)). However, given their ‘satisficing’ nature, and their blurred links
with (possibly conflicting) goals, a) they leave open “reason-based” decision-procedures:
“decisions . . . ar often reached by focusing on the reasons that justify the selection
of one option over another. Different frames, contexts and elicitation procedures
highlight different aspects of the options and bring forth different reasons and consid-
erations that influence decisions”. (Shafir, Simonson and Tversky (1993), p. 34);
and, b) the choice process is often guided by heuristic criteria which might not bear any
rigorous mapping into any underlying coherent structure of preferences. Note that point
a) implies a sort of inseparability between preference-formation and preference-revelation
(through the choices act): in a sense, preferences are constructed through the very process
of deliberation. An implication, in this perspective, is that one cannot innocently separate
some unequivocal objective (e.g. max∪(., ., ·)) from the algorithms for its implementation.
Rather, mental and behavioural models are (rough) templates for the elicitation of both the
choice procedures and what is to be preferred. Point (b) finds ample support from what in
various models of consumer’s behaviour are called non-compensatory criteria of choice (e.g.
heuristics often based on hierarchical filtering procedures, ‘focusing’ upon salient aspects
of the choice context, exercises of comparison with prototypical expectations, etc.): cf.
Earl (1986) and Davetag (1995), and the references therein.11
3. Habits, routines and explicit deliberative processes coexist to varying degrees, as
determinants of most consumption acts.
As Olshavsky and Granbois (1979) put it (also cited in Earl (1986)),
“For many purchases a decision process never occurs, not even on the first purchase
. . . Purchases can occur out of necessity; they can be derived from culturally mandated
lifestyles or from interlocked purchases; they can reflect preferences acquired in early
childhood; they can result from simple conformity to group norms or from imitation
of others; purchases can be made exclusively on recommendations from personal or
non-personal sources; they can be made on the basis of surrogates of various types; or
they can even occur on a random or superficial basis . . . Even when purchase behaviour
is preceded by a choice process, [the latter] is likely to be very limited. It typically
involves the evaluation of few alternatives, little external search, few evaluative criteria,
and simple evaluation models”. (Olshavsky and Granbois (1979), pp. 98–99.)
Clearly, the evidence on routinization of behavioural patterns is quite in tune with that
taken on board and theorized upon, in other domains of economic activity, by various
evolutionary approaches: cf. in particular Nelson and Winter (1982) and Cohen et al.
(1996). And, of course, it fits well the ample sociological evidence on adaptation to
specific social roles.12
11Interestingly this literature mainly from marketing or from experimental studies has drawn relatively
little attention from the scholars more directly inspired by standard economic theory: cf., for example,
the otherwise thorough and balanced discussions of models and statistical evidence of Brown and Deaton
(1972) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). Note that, conversely, the ‘compensatory’ archetype of choice
is a necessary condition for maximization over convex combinations of attributes (or goods) and prices.
Attempts to hold together standard decision-theoretic assumptions and the acknowledgement of some non-
convexities in the purported utility sets have been made through so-called ‘multi-attribute utility theory’
(cf. Dyer et al. (1992); see also Fishburn (1974)).
12Incidentally, note that in the early works of G. Becker, one finds the possibility of explanations of
economic behaviours based on habits rather utility maximization: cf. Becker (1962).
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More generally:
4. Consumption habit and routines, and, dynamically, their formation and acquisition,
are embedded in the processes of socialization and identity-building.
The ‘social embeddedness’ notion of economic behaviours is obviously near the spirit of
a lot of sociological thinking and evidence (for appraisals relevant for the current discussion
cf., among others Granovetter (1985), Baron and Hannan (1994), Hodgson (1988); see
also Dosi (1995) and Coriat and Dosi (1995) on the background of some of the ideas
put forward here). Taken seriously, that view implies also that one should be wary of
assuming any individual preference structures (or, for that matter, individual behavioural
patterns) as sole ‘primitives’ of microfounded theories of economic behaviours. Rather, one
from the start ought to account for explicit dynamics of collective adaptation. Multiple
factors support this view. Some of them underlie the possibility of social bandwagon
effects (Lebeinstein (1976)). Freely citing from Granovetter and Soong (1986, pp. 84–
5), they include interpersonal correlations of preferences nested in (a) status seeking;
(b) consumption externalities of whatever kind; and (c) the revealed outcome of other
people’s experiences as surrogate for one’s own search.13 Even more profoundly, social
adaptation also in consumption patterns is likely to be part of fundamental processes
of identity-building, involving (imperfect) adaptation to the habits and norms of specific
social groups. In this respect, many works of Bourdieu are suggestive illustrations of how
the social context contributors to structure social behaviours and revealed preferences (cf.
Bourdieu (1976) and (1979); see also Berger and Luckmann (1967)).14
However, at least in contemporary capitalist economies, adaptation to social roles is
rather imperfect, ridden of conflicts and of multiple (possibly contradictory) archetypical
identities, with these archetypes themselves changing rather quickly over time.15
As a consequence,
5. Habits and routines-formation hold varying and precarious balances with search and
innovation.
Pushing it to some extreme, the idea is that a good part of the complement to one of
routinized relatively automatic and repetitive, consumption patterns is not any canonically
“rational” deliberative choice, but rather some wilder process of search/experimentation,
whereby also some “utility” (whatever that means) is drawn from the very exploratory pro-
cess. Whether or not one subscribed to the general anthropologic conjecture by Scilovsky
(1992) on the intrinsic stimuli and pleasure brought about by novelty16, there is certainly
strong empirical ground to the idea that, at least in a few circumstances, consumers ‘exper-
iment’, ‘explore’, ‘discover’, develop novel ‘consumption technologies’ and lifestyles, etc.
(cf. Earl (1986) and Bianchi (1997)). As with routines, we find here some loose analogy
with the exploratory patterns of producers, much more investigated in the literature on
the economics of technological innovation (cf. Freeman (1982), Rosenberg (1982), Dosi
13Conversely, differentiation effects may emerge as well, such as ‘snob’ inclinations to distinguish oneself
from the revealed majority (and also more complex – “cognitively dissonant” – attitudes such as those
summarized by Marx (Graucho), unwilling to “join any club which would accept him as a member . . . ”)
14Straightforwardly, this point links with the previous ones on ‘mental models’ and ‘lifestyles’: in this
perspective, the evolution of the latter is dynamically coupled with a social context framing the meanings
and also the reinforcements (the “pleasures and pains”) of individual experiences.
15For insightful discussions on potentially “multiple selves” pertinent to different domains of experience,
cf. Elster (1986). A subtle issue, which cannot be pursued here is the relative “rational” coherence of each
of the purported “selves”: however, as it should be clear from the foregoing argument, we are inclined to
depict a “self” (i.e. an identity) with a good deal of internal inconsistencies in both goals and procedures
in order to achieve them.
16With a robust body of evidence from experimental psychology supporting it, notwithstanding equally
robust examples of reinforcements to social adaptation.
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(1988), Nelson and Winter (1982)).
6. (Imperfect) social adaptation, learning – on both preferences and consumption
‘technologies’ – and search, all entail path-dependencies (at the very least at individual
level).
By now, it is, at last, generally acknowledged that both collective externalities and
dynamic increasing returns generally involve dependence of dynamic paths upon initial
conditions (or, in richer stochastic formulations, the dependence of limit states upon early
fluctuations). However, in a strange paradox, the relevance of this widespread phenomenon
has been much more emphasized on the supply side of production and technological inno-
vation (cf. among others, David (1985), Arthur (1988), Dosi (1997)), rather than on the
final demand side. It is some paradox because on the supply side, microeconomic path-
dependencies (for example, regarding the learning patterns of individual firms) might
not exert long-term collective influences insofar as selection environments (e.g. markets)
remain testbeds for different innovative trial-and-errors on the grounds of unchanged selec-
tion criteria (i.e. insofar as the “selection landscape” remains unchanged). Conversely, on
the final demand side, agent-specific and collective path-dependencies are even more likely
to arise, since there is no “selection environment” to speak of (after all everyone agrees
that, except for ethical considerations, “de gustibus non est disputandum” . . . ). In its
essence, the point had been already made by Duersenberry when taking issue against the
assumptions that, first, “every individual’s consumption behaviour is independent of that
of every other individual, and [second], the consumption relations are reversible in time”
(Duersenberry (1949), p. 1). 17 Since then a lot of corroborating evidence on consumer
behaviours has indeed supported both of Duersenberry’s counterassumptions (cf. Earl
(1986)), without, however, any appropriate acknowledgement in terms of demand theory.
7. From ‘stylized facts’ to theoretical first approximations: α) complementarities within
lifestyle-shaped consumption-systems; and, β) lexicographic patterns of consumer’s selec-
tion over hedonic attributes and goods.
At least as a first cut, let us assume that (socially shaped) ‘mental models’ link together
multiple – and, possibly, partly contradictory – goals, heuristics perceived to be appropri-
ate to their achievement, and particular types of goods. After all, if different “lifestyles”
exist, they ought to involve discretely different maps across these sets of variables. In turn,
collectively shared models and behavioural patterns are likely to involve proximate com-
plementarities in preference structures over both hedonic attributes of goods and goods
themselves. (In an illustrative caricature, one is not very likely to find Ferrari drivers
wearing chainstore shoes; or Mozart-fanatics content to listen to music on a walkman
. . . ). Complementarities are, of course, enormously reinforced by ‘harder’ social interde-
pendencies – like those linking patterns of spatial mobility, uses of leisure time, ownership
of cars, service stations, presence of infrastructures like highways – etc. And, relatedly,
mental models and social lifestyles add up to more mundane ‘physical’ hierarchies of needs
in determining rough lexicographic orders of consumption priorities. Hence, on the top
of rather predictable hierarchies from basic necessities (such as food) to more discretional
expenditures, socially acquired norms and visions tend to drive proximate rankings over
commodities, or classes of them well above the sheer physiological constraints. This does
not mean of course that discretionality, ‘choice’, price-dependent substitution, etc. are
17Again path dependency at both individual and collective levels was among Veblen’s intuitions, e.g.
when emphasizing that “ . . . institutions of today . . . the present accepted scheme of life . . . do not entirely
fit the situation of today. At the same time, men’s present habit of thought tend to persist indefinitely,
except as circumstances enforce a change these institutions which have been handed down, these habits of
thought . . .mental attitudes . . . are therefore themselves a conservative factor. This is the factor of social
inertia, psychological inertia, conservatism” (Veblen (1899), p. 141).
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ruled out. On the contrary, cognitive and behavioural structures can be seen as a sort of
basin of attraction allowing for a good deal of stochastic fluctuations where both explicit
deliberations and path-dependent influences play major roles. However, we still maintain
the hypothesis that while ‘compensatory choices’ might hold locally for butter vs. veg-
etable oil, etc., broader changes in consumption patterns are largely nested into deeper,
discrete, changes in cognition and socialization models (and in ways possibly independent
from any change in relative prices).
To sum up: a descriptive theory of consumption should in principle encompass rel-
atively ordered “models” and “lifestyles” which path-dependently evolve through both
(imperfect) social imitation and innovation. Can one capture at least some elements of
this view in a formal model? This is what we shall address in the next section.
3 The Model
Since the representation of our agents is based on a modified version of Genetic Algorithms
(GA), it is worth to start from a concise presentation of the latter (much more in Holland
(1975) and Goldberg (1989)).
In essence a GA is based on the reproduction and modification of information coded
on strings of finite length. In an analogy with DNA coding, think of a sequentially ordered
set of elements (genes in the biological interpretations, demanded goods in the application
which follows). Each element can take two or more alternative forms (or “alleles”): below
straightforwardly it can have two states, 1 or 0, that is the good is either demanded or
not by any one consumer.18 Hence, for example, the string {01010} encodes the fact that
the consumer is going to demand only – reading from left to right – the second and the
fourth good. GA’s evolve through two operators, namely crossover and mutation.
Crossover entails a recombination over two “parent” GA’s. For example, give two
GA’s, say,
01010
and
10011,
a random draw of an integer K (in the case, 1 ≤ K ≤ 5) determine, so to speak, the
“cutting point” (say, 3). In this case the recombined strings will consist of the first three
alleles of the first one and the last two of the second one,
01011
and, vice-versa, for the second “child”:
10010
i.e. the first three of the second “parent” and the last two of the first one.
Mutation involves the change of state of any one random element on the sequence
(from 0 to 1 or vice-versa).
In the standard formulation, strings are in turn selected over time according to their
relative “fitness” as revealed by the environmental payoffs that they obtain. This will
not be so in the model which follows. As already mentioned, there is no reason to think
that some consumption pattern may be intrinsically “better” than another one, and, in
18For our purpose here we can neglect the element (*) of the GA alphabet, meaning “wild cards” whose
specification does not affect the overall performance of the string itself.
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any case, there is no collective mechanism (thank God!!) to check it. Therefore, more
technically, our GA’s evolve over a flat selection landscape, solely driven by crossover and
mutation. The death process (of strings) in our model is only determined by the (time-
lagged) effects of budget constraints (“. . . once upon a time, I desired to have a villa at Cap
Ferrat, five servants and caviar every day . . . however, I have now forgotten all that, and
I am quite content with my little apartment and meat twice a week . . . ”). In the model
that follows each element of the string encodes, as mentioned, one particular commodity
(which might or might not be supplied at any particular time t).19
For our purposes here, GA’s provide a simple (albeit inevitably rough) account of
an evolving lexicographic order over the desired commodities, whose structure is indeed a
proxy for the ‘lifestyle’ of the consumer20 Needless to say, the model of consumer behaviour
that we propose is highly stylized and ‘abstract’ – possibly as ‘abstract’ as the standard
utility based model. However, the assumptions that it incorporates are radically different
from the latter in that it tries to capture (a) the social nature of preference formation; (b)
the role of individual and collective history; (c) the formation (and change) of consumption
habits; and (d) the permanent possibility of innovation. Contrary to the canonic decision
model, we assume agents with extremely limited computational capabilities, but with the
possibility of “learning their preferences” through the very process by which they select
their consumption patterns.21
Representation of Consumers
At any time t each consumer j is characterized by:
• yj(t), its income level (in monetary terms);
• rj(t), the income class to which it belong (these classes endogenously change as
income grow: see also below);
• Lτj (t), a binary string of length l (with l = number of actual and eventually possible
goods), where each i - element (1, · · · i · · · l) takes the value of 1 or 0 depending
to whether the corresponding good appears or not in the consumption pattern of
consumer j. (In the simulations of the model which follows we set l = 223.) Note
also that goods are further distinguished according to their product group g (below
g = 1, · · · , 5);
• Sj(t), a string of length l coding the actual expenditures (in monetary terms) on
each good i (clearly, taking value zero for all goods which have a zero on the Lτj (t)
string);
• Lfj (t), a binary string of length l, which we call “frustrated memory” where element
i(= 1, · · · l) takes value 1 if that good has been selected to be part of one’s own con-
sumption pattern but no purchase has yet been made due to the budget constraint.
Note that whenever a purchase occur on any i in Lfj (t), that i will start to appear
as “1” on the string of actual consumption patterns Lτj (t), and correspondingly dis-
appear from the “frustrated memory” (a “1” will turn into a “0”). We shall see
below how the frustrated memory emerges, as indirect outcome of innovation and
19In the latter case, of course, the corresponding value of that element will be zero for all consumers.
20Here and throughout, there is a major, and admittedly unresolved, ambiguity between preferences over
‘attributes’ vs. preferences over commodities. While we share with Earl (1986), and, before, Lancaster
(1971), the idea that some underlying (hedonic) attributes and not commodities themselves are the object
of consumption acts, our very simple model avoids any explicit account of the “cognitive” mappings between
the former and the latter, and their evolution in the minds of consumers.
21More detail on a slightly different version of the model is in Aversi (1990).
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social imitation; moreover, it stochastically decays as exponential function of time
(so that, “1”’s turn “radioactively” into “0”’s as time goes by);
• Sfj (t), a string of length l, listing the desired expenditures (in monetary terms)
corresponding to the items which appear on the “frustrated memory”.
This description of the consumers, together with the string P (t), which is the system-
level vector of unit prices pi(t) is sufficient to determine the actual quantities purchased
by each j.22
Income dynamics
(Monetary) incomes of individual consumers are random walks with a drift so that
yJ (t+ 1) = yj(t)(1 + ǫj(t)) (1)
where ǫi(t) is an i.i.d. random variable drawn from a truncated normal N (µ, σ
2).
Truncation is such to prevent for simplicity negative income changes (throughout the
simulations presented here we assume µ = .03 and µ = σ2).
Consumers do not save (except possibly for some residual involuntary saving, see be-
low): hence in general income is equal to total expenditure (correspondingly, all commodi-
ties ought to be rigorously considered as “non-durables”).
Income classes
We define r income classes (r = 20, initially set so that the higher value of the class
exceed the lower one by µ% (obviously, near the very beginning of the simulation most of
the classes are going to be empty: see below on “initial conditions”). As incomes growth,
the 20 classes are endogenously redefined so that they will continue to partition the whole
population in 20 groups of log-identical sizes.
Old and new products
At the beginning of “history” (i.e. at t = 0), available commodities are very few,
and mainly concentrated in product group one (the metaphorical equivalent of “basic
necessities”). Hence also most elements in the strings Lr(·)(·) and P (·) have value zero.
However, at each time new commodities stochastically arrive, whose number is drawn
from a Poisson distribution. Given that number, each virtual i (that is each commodity
which takes at t − 1 a value zero on the price vector) has a uniform probability to come
to existence. Consider all that as a simplified version of some unspecified dynamics of
innovation on the supply side. Note that whenever a new commodity is born, it appears
with a positive price in the P (·) vector. That, however, does not automatically imply that
it is bought by any one consumer (see below on “innovation”). A commodity unsold for
more that τ periods (in our simulations τ = 3) becomes “dead”.
Commodity unit prices
When a commodity is introduced it is associated with a random price p
(0)
i , drawn from
a uniform distribution defined on a finite support (in our simulations, 1 ≤ p
(0)
i ≤ 100).
We experimented with two versions of price dynamics. In version 1,
pi(t+ 1) = p
(0)
i (1 + ǫi(t)) (2)
22In the model we assume indivisibility of the first unit purchased, but divisibility over any amount
above 1 (one might want to consider that as a very rough proxy of quality-related differentiation, albeit
totally unspecified on the supply side, so that, for example “one and a half” unit of a commodity might
be metaphorically understood as one unit plus added gadgets and optionals . . . ). We further add the
convention that any commodity i which is not actually produced at t has price zero and obviously cannot
be bought by any consumers.
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where ǫi(t) is an i.i.d. random variable drawn from a truncated normal distribution
with zero mean, defined over −1 < −a ≤ ǫ ≤ +a.
In version 2,
pi(t+ 1) = p
(0)
i (
∑
t
qi(t))
αi (3)
where αi ≤ 0 and qi(t) stand for total quantities of the commodity sold at each t. In a
nutshell, in version 1, prices are subject to uncorrelated random shocks, while in version
2, they fall as a function of cumulated sales, in a fashion similar to what is often suggested
in the literature on “learning curves” and dynamic increasing returns.
Dynamics of individual consumption
At each “period” after individual incomes have been updated, each consumer faces
four stochastic alternatives, namely,
1. Leave unchanged the consumption basket, with probability θu. In the following we
have assumed θui identical for all i’s and experimented with different parametriza-
tions, ranging from .2 to .8). Under this option, all budget items are identically
increased in proportion to income growth.23
2. Access the ‘frustrated memory’ with probability θfi . In this case, all income increase
is in principle devoted to the purchase of one or more items which, as mentioned,
had been acquired as part of the chosen “lifestyle” but could not be bought due
to the budget constraint. (Note that despite income growth, the addition of new
items to the actual consumption basked is not necessarily guaranteed: see below on
“adjustment algorithms”).
3. Change (part) of the consumption patterns via innovation or imitation with proba-
bility (1 − θmi − θ
f
i ). In our model, quite in tune with the evidence on innovation
diffusion24, we have assumed that, once the consumer has stochastically “decided” to
change, the innovative option (i.e. adopt a new product) is a function of its income
class, ri
25. The complement to one is the effort to imitate, which, we assume, is re-
stricted to one’s own income class and higher ones (if any). Imitation has clearly to
do also with phenomena of social integration, formation of (partially) homogeneous
lifestyles within similar social groups or, conversely, efforts to sanction upward social
mobility. A rough way to capture all that is by assuming that the consumer to be
imitated is drawn from a Poisson-type distribution with mean 1 (for the purposes
of this draw we reclassify income classes, so that we indicate with zero the class to
which the consumer belongs, with 1 that immediately higher, etc.).26
23That hypothesis amount to assuming, under this option, a homothetic demand function with unitary
price elasticities of demand. It is an extreme assumption, running counter a lot of evidence on different
price- and income-elasticities of different goods. We made in just in order not to inbuild any possible
emergent properties of the model into the assumptions. Hence, for example, if Engel-type patterns in
budget coefficients were to emerge, they ought to be solely due to the dynamics of preference evolution
and not to some pre-imposed preference structure differently weighting different goods as incomes grow. Of
course a fortiori, the conclusions would hold in a more realistic model that would allow for both preference
evolution and “intrinsic” propensities e.g. to trade off “inferior” and “superior” goods.
24See for example Rogers (1983). Discussions of evidence and models of innovation diffusion from
different angles are in Mahajar, Muller and Bass (1989), Dosi (1992) and Stoneman (1995).
25We assume that the probability of innovating is distributed as an exponential function of the income
classes.
26Since the distribution will have a truncation corresponding to the highest income class, probabilities
are proportionally reassigned to the relevant income classes.
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3a. Innovation
If the consumer has opted, so to speak, for the “exploration” route, it randomly draws
(within a uniform probability distribution) one of the “new” products which have become
available (see above) but are not included in its desired consumption patterns of that
particular consumer.
3b. Imitation
Conversely, under the imitation made, after having selected the income class to be
imitated, through the above procedure, a consumer is randomly selected in that class,
and, together, a random product group from g. Next, the crossover operator from GA’s
is applied to the substring corresponding to that product aggregate and that consumer.27
In that way, the imitator “borrows” so to speak, part of the preference structure of the
imitated agent, and in a first approximation, also its budget allocation to the corresponding
items (that is the relevant parts of the strings Lτk(t− 1) and Sk(t− 1), with k being the
imitated agent).28
Adjustment algorithms
Given the indivisibility of the first unit of any item of consumption (cf. footnote 18)
changes in the consumption patterns – no matter whether due to access to the “frustrated
memory”, innovation or imitation – do not necessarily fulfill the budget constraint. If they
do, the new consumption profile will be implemented (with any possible income residual
being subject again to the same stochastic allocation process described so far (i.e. between
“no change”, memory-activation, imitation, innovation). If the new consumption profile,
on the contrary, violates the budget constraint, an iterated procedure of adjustment is
implemented checking whether relatively “local” adjustments can accomodate for the new
desired expenditures. The steps are the following:
a) check if reductions of expenditures over up to 5 goods within the same product
group are sufficient to make up to the novel desired expenditure (under the requirement
of a minimal unitary expenditure on the former);
b) same as sub a) plus the reduction of desired quantities of new items to one unit
each;
c) same as b), but with the added possibility of giving up entirely up to 2 “old” goods;
d) same procedure as a) and b), but with the expenditure reduction applicable to the
whole consumption string (up to a maximum of 10 items);
e) same procedure as c), again applied to the whole string.
We assume that the corresponding changes in consumption patterns always occur
when either steps a) or b) generate budget-consistent schedules, while they happen only
in probability in cases c) to e) (with the probability falling from the former to the latter).29
This algorithm, as simple as it is, is meant to capture the relative inertia and path-
dependency of “models of consumption” and related “lifestyles”. Moreover, note that
when only part of the new desired expenditures can be fulfilled, in the spirit of our earlier
considerations on lexicographic hierarchies in consumption, the order of priorities goes
27Out of the two substrings so obtained, the imitator is assumed to retain that which has on the
righthand the preferences of the imitated consumer. (Recall that the whole string can be read from left to
right as going from “old” to “new” products, and in terms of product aggregates, from necessities to more
discretional items of expenditure . . . )
28In fact, we allow also with small probability a sort of ‘involuntary innovation’ to occur through the
imitation process, in so far as the relevant part of the Lτk(·) sting is imperfectly copied (with a “0” instead
of “1” or vice-versa).
29In order to prevent nearly infinite recursions, we stipulate that whenever the income to be allocated
is less than 5% of the total disposable income, that will be added to next period income as a sort of
“involuntary savings”.
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“from left to right” on the string, in terms of product groups. Whenever, after the men-
tioned adjustment iterations, some (or all) desired new expenditures remail unfulfilled,
they transit upon the “frustrated memory”.
Initial Conditions
At time zero, we assume consumers (1000 in the following) with an identical (and low)
income and identical preferences over a small number of initially available commodities
(below, 5 goods of which 3 within group 1, i.e. “necessities”).
One of the purposes of the model is precisely to see whether, notwithstanding these
initial conditions and the quite simple dynamics described above, the model can generate
as sorts of emergent properties30 some of the regularities that one generally detect in the
empirically observed consumption patterns.
4 A Preliminary Look At Some Statistical Properties
Let us begin by noticing that the model endogenously generates differentiation in indi-
vidual consumption patterns, and, at the same time, entails processes of social imitation
which prevents such diversity from exploding. Despite totally uniform initial conditions,
as incomes stochastically grow, both patterns of consumptions and “preferences” evolve
in ways that are path-dependent and socially embedded. Path-dependency appears at two
levels: first, the individual consumption patterns at any time depend also on the sequence
of past “preferences” and consumption acts, second, indirectly, they depend on the whole
collective history of the latter. Relatedly, the social embeddedness of the dynamics is
straightforward, in that preferences and revealed purchasing patterns emerge from collec-
tive mechanisms of social imitation, which represent also ordering mechanisms, possibly
accounting for the relative predictability of aggregate patterns over time.31 Finally, the
model allows the persistent exploration of new items of consumption – and through that,
an everlasting evolution of “lifestyles”. (In the present model, almost entirely focused on
the demand side, this implies that implicit dynamics on the supply side provide co-evolving
opportunities of innovation).32 Given all that, an important “exercise in plausibility” (al-
though not a rigorous validation of the model itself) is, as mentioned in the introduction
to this work the analysis of the patterns of consumption generated by the model.33
Diffusion Patterns
Figures 1 and 2 depict two quite typical diffusion profiles that the model generates,
displaying the usual S-shape generally found in the empirical diffusion patterns (cf. among
others, Rogers (1983), Mahajan et al. (1989), Gru¨bler and Nakicenovic (1992)). With
regards to empirical data, one often finds in the literature estimates of the rate equations
30For a detailed discussion of this notion, cf. Lane (1993).
31Incidentally, note that our model does not appear to display, under the parameterizations which we
explored, those phenomena of sudden “regime transitions” and possibly chaotic behaviour predicted by the
model of social imitation of Granovetter and Soong (1986). Our intuition is that this does not happen
here, first, because of the higher path-dependency, and thus “inertia” inbuild in our model. Second, here
consumer tend to imitate consumption bundles and not individual items, implying also a slower and more
imperfect drive to social uniformity (since the imitated bundles are generally different from each other).
However, it does not seem unlikely that Granovetter and Soong’s properties could emerge in modified
versions of this model allowing for e.g. “fashion” goods, faster rates of imitation on them and sampling
mechanisms for the imitation with respect to the imitated population.
32Note, incidentally, that empirically testing restrictions on a purported (and unobservable) “utility
function” does not have a much different epistemological status.
33The simulations discussed in the following are based on 500-period runs with 1000 agents. Unless
otherwise specified the results which we present hold for the whole range of parametrizations on the
“inertia” consumption patterns (i.e. the probability of sticking to the past basket composition) which we
varied from .2 to .8. Similarly, they hold under both versions of price dynamics (see above).
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of the diffusion process as a (non-linear) function of the number of potential adopters
and of the total number of consumers who have already adopted the commodity in their
consumptin basket. A typical model is some discretization of a rate equation such as
dN(t)
dt
= aN¯ + (b− a)N (t)−
b
N¯
(N (t))2 (4)
when N stands for the total number of adopters at t, N¯ is the number of potential
adopters, the parameter a is meant to capture the “autonomous” (i.e., in our language,
“innovation-related”) adoption choices and b is the “imitation-related” choices – nonlin-
early dependent on N – (cf. Mahajan et al. (1989)). (Note also that in our model as well
as in reality, “older” commodities may be driven out of the consumption baskets by the
arrival of new ones.) For sake of illustration, we report in Appendix 1 one of the estimates
of the discrete reformulation of (4)
s(t) = α+ β(N (t− 1)) + δ(N (t− 1))2 (5)
where s(t) is the net arrival of new adopters at t. Notwithstanding their widespread use,
however, estimates of models like (5) are ridden with serious econometric problems (see
Appendix 2). Hence, we do not want to make much out of it. Let us simply state primarily
as a conjecture apparently not contradicted by the data that “autonomous” innovation
in consumption, and, together, social imitation do not only appear in the “microscopic”
description of how agents evolve their consumption patterns, but they seem to carry over
to the “macroscopic” description of system dynamics.
Engel-type Dynamics of Consumption Patterns and Structural Instability
As mentioned earlier, in order not to bias by construction our results, we have made the
extreme (and unrealistic) hypothesis that, when consumers opt for the reproduction over
time of their past consumption patterns they do so in a way that amounts to assuming
a homothetic demand with unitary price elasticity. It is interesting to check whether
despite this assumption, long-term changes in budget coefficients emerge, driven by social
innovation and imitation, jointly with stochastically growing incomes. Remarkably, they
do, displaying Engel-type patterns of evolution in the share of different product groups.
This type of dynamics appears must evidently in the case of group 1 (a metaphorical proxy
for “necessities”) and group 5 (which, being on the right-hand part of the consumption
string is, in probability, “filled up” after more basic necessities have been satisfied): see
Figures 3 and 4. More rigorously, Tables 1 and 2 (Appendix 2) report estimates (over
subperiods) of a model of the form
bg(t) = α+ βt+ g1 log yt + δ2 log yt−1 · · ·+ λ1p1 + λ2p2 · · ·λ5p5 + ǫt (6)
where bg(t) are the shares in aggregate consumption of product groups g (g = 1, Table
1 and g = 5, Table 2), t is a time trend; yt · · ·yt−τ are the simultaneous and lagged per
capita real incomes and p1 · · ·p5 are the values of the price index of each product group
(the simulations have been carried out under the stationary/stochastic price version: see
above and Appendix 2).
Price-coefficients although with the negative sign are not generally significant (neither
in the estimates shown here nor in most other tests that we have carried out) – which
is not too surprising given our extreme assumptions. What is much more interesting
is the significant effect of both a trend component and lagged incomes, yielding Engel-
type patterns which are purely an aggregate emergent property, driven by the collective
exploration of new consumption opportunities, together with the progressive relaxation of
budget constraints.
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Tests on other simulation results, not shown here, conducted on “version 2” of price
dynamics (i.e. prices falling along with “learning curves”) suggest a model specification
where all variable are I (1). (Hence the analyses have been carried out on the differences
of the logs of the variables.) While in general Engel-type patterns continue to emerge, also
prices (both the price index of the group in question and of the others) appear often to exert
a significant influence of the dynamics of budget shares (up to the fifth lag, and mostly but
not always with the expected sign). However, note that, again, this should be considered
an emergent property which does not bear any isomorphism with microscopic behaviour:
in fact, by construction, individual agents either have unit price elasticities when acting
“business-as-usual” or do not look at all at prices when imitating or innovating – except
in sofar as prices affect budget constraints. Indeed, what appears in the aggregate as the
dynamic influence of prices upon shares rests in fact on the process by which the fall in
the former help relaxing budget constraints (a sort of a dynamic version of an income
effect) and that in turn makes easier innovation, imitation and fulfillment of “frustrated”
options.
Moreover, in empirical time prices, one often detects evidence of important and gener-
alized structural breaks in the patterns of consumption within and across product groups
(on the former, cf. Combris (1992); more generally on changes in consumption patterns, cf.
Houthakker ((1957) and (1965)), Kuznets (1962), Gardes and Louvet (1986), Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980)). Remarkably, notwithstanding our rather rudimentary behavioural as-
sumptions, structural instability – most often emerges when testing so-called “quasi-ideal”
models of longitudinal expenditure patterns (cf. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Blundell,
Pashardes and Weber (1993)) – with respect to both commodity groups and within groups
shares of individual commodities. When applying the usual tests for structural stability
(Chow, CUSUM, and CUSUMSQ), one generally finds (especially with regards to aggre-
gates 1 and 5) significant structural change, intertwined by rather long periods of structural
stability. At the risk of some overinterpretation, these patterns might suggest the easy
emergence of puntuated discontinuities in historically shaped, collectively shared, “models
of consumptions”, which however display a “metastable” character (in the sense that they
persist on time scales of orders of magnitude greater that those of the processes which
generated them, but nonetheless tend to vanish with probability one as time goes on).34
‘Demand Laws’ With Innovative Exploration and Social Adaptation
As emphasized in the introduction to this work, a crucial question concerns the ro-
bustness of aggregate economic propositions, such as “demand laws”, well beyond those
circumstances whereby aggregate dynamics is presumed to exactly map into corresponding
behavioural patterns of some purported ‘representative’ (most often, utility-maximizing)
agent. A major advantage of a model such as that presented here is that one is bound to
specify the microscopic decision algorithms, which, in our case, are clearly at odds with any
assumption of both a) statistical invariance in some ‘revealed preferences’, and, at least
equally important, b) algorithmic coherence in the choice process. Do well-established
pieces of conventional economic wisdom – such as downward sloping demand schedules for
individual commodities – hold in these cases too?
As mentioned in the introduction, this is precisely the question addressed by Hilde-
brand (1994), in a perspective which is on purpose much more agnostic about microeco-
nomic decision rules. Here, having constructed the data generating process we may also
try to establish the nature of the underlying micro conditions under which “demand law”
34A stimulating discussion of metastability notions in the domain of evolutionary models in economics
is in Lane (1993). Conversely, on the recurrence and economic importance of specific social “norms of
consumption”, cf. the broad historical interpretations in Aglietta (1979) and Boyer (1986).
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type propositions apply. As a premise, note that we have already touched the issue, from a
dynamic point of view, hinting that, for commodity aggregates, seemingly “well-behaved”
demand schedules might (often but not always) emerge out of the interactions between
price changes, dynamic income effects, social imitation, relaxation of budget constraints
. . .
However, “laws of demand” as commonly depicted starting from undergraduate courses
in economics, imply a major static (with respect to time) thought-experiment. That is,
despite the fact that at any given time one obviously observes only one price/quantity
combination, what would happen if the price of the commodity at hand were higher/lower –
holding constant all other system parameters and micro decision rules? Hildebrand (1994)
proves indeed some sufficient conditions for standard demand-law propositions (and weaker
versions thereof) to hold, which carry observationally testable implications concerning the
distribution of demand patterns, at any t, conditional on different income classes (cf.
Appendix 3).
One of the basic ideas is that if the distribution of preferences – irrespective of how they
formed (or, for that matter, of how coherent they are) – is sufficiently homogeneous across
income cohorts, one can establish sufficient conditions to guarantee non-upward-sloping
notional demand curves (at each t), whose fulfilment can be detected from the statistical
properties of actual demand conditional on different income classes.
In brief, a “law of demand” (LD) is verified (i.e. the demand function Ft(p) is strictly
monotonically decreasing) if for any pair of price vectors p and p′ (with p different from
p′)
(p− p′)(Ft(p)− Ft(p
′)) < 0
A weaker version is represented by the so-called Wald axiom (WA), that is
(p− p′)Ft(p
′) ≤ 0 implies (p− p′)F (p) ≤ 0 (7)
or in the strict formulation, where
(p− p′)Ft(p
′) ≤ 0 implies (p− p′)F (p) < 0 (8)
The “law of demand” satisfies Wald Axiom but the converse is not true. The bot-
tom line is how to establish the conditions under which the LD and the WA are verified
without imposing corresponding restrictions on (unobservable) individual demand sched-
ules. These conditions turn out to be related to various measures of dispersion of demand
patterns across income cohorts: cf. Appendix 3.
In that appendix we show that, indeed, under some parametrizations of our model the
conditions for the WA (and also for the LD) are satisfied. Note, again, that this is another
emergent property of the model which does not necessarily find any direct isomorphism
into micro behavioural rules. It is also interesting to observe under which specifications
of the model these properties hold. The results presented in Appendix 3 apply under the
stationary-price version, with relatively high inertia in individual consumption patterns.35
However, as an admittedly preliminary exploration of different parameter values show that
the LD and WA properties tend to be lost as one increases the probability of innovating
(and this is so, above some threshold, also if one correspondingly increases the probability
of imitating, too).
Our conjecture is that in fact the fulfilment of the conditions for the LD and WA to
hold are ultimately determined by (imperfect) social imitation, so that the distribution of
35In the simulations analyzed there the probability of sticking to the past is .8).
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notional “preferences” – or “desired lifestyles” – are not too different across income classes,
together with the different impact that budget constraints exert on actual expenditures
of consumers (so that, loosely speaking, with higher incomes, the “cloud” of commodity
combinations corresponding to each consumer tend to be more dispersed).36
However, if innovative behaviours acquire a major role in the evolution of individual
consumption patterns the relative homogeneity of the distribution of “preferences” across
income classes (i.e. what Hildebrand (1994) calls “metonymy” of demand schedules) tends
to be lost, and with that also the aggregate statistical properties sufficient for the vali-
dation of the “law of demand” and of the Wald Axiom. Let us state this conjecture
in a more extreme and provocative way: a) whenever one abandons the assumptions of
well-behaved micro preference functions together with rather demanding and quite ad hoc
restrictions on their distributions, aggregate LD and/or WA properties might continue
to hold as statistical collective properties (these are Hildebrand’s results); however, b)
what basically determines these aggregate properties are ultimately phenomena of social
imitations, together with budget constraints; and, relatedly, c) sufficiently fast processes
of “autonomous” consumer innovation might also imply the breakdown of conventional
assumptions on (static) inverse relations between prices and demanded quantities.
5 Conclusions
In this work, building on what we consider to be some general empirical properties of
consumption decisions and their evolution, we have developed a simple model which tries to
capture – albeit in a very rudimentary form – phenomena like the existence of recognizably
different “lifestyles”, lexicographic orders on consumption acts, (limited) path-dependency
of individual and collective consumption patterns, innovation and social imitation. It
turns out that, despite its simplicity, the model generate emerging aggregate patterns of
consumption with statistical properties quite in tune with empirically observed regularities,
such as S-shaped diffusion of new commodities, Engel-type dynamics of budget shares,
and under quite a few micro parametrizations, distributions of consumption coefficients
yielding in the aggregate notional downward sloping demand curves. Of course, one can
think of several improvements upon both the model and the exploration of the statistical
properties of the data it generates.
Concerning the model, one can easily imagine two complementary directions. On the
one hand, one might gain many insight from models which, paraphrasing Malerba et al.
(1996), are more “evidence-friendly”, in that they take on board much more detailed phe-
nomenological specifications on e.g. cognitive processes of formation of ‘lifestyles’, decision
rules, different characteristics of commodities, “consumption technologies”, etc. (For ex-
ample, it is obvious that the distribution between durables vs. non-durables, necessities
vs. discretionary items, etc. are likely to map also into different decision rules . . . ). In the
same vein, sooner or later, one will have to tackle the challenge of providing more rigorous
accounts of coevolutionary processes among consumption acts, preferences and cognitive
representations (as pleaded, with reference to other economic domains, in Marengo and
Tordjman (1996) and Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo (1996)). In the other direction, one
might want to explore the properties of even more reduced form models with some hope
36Note that the two propositions are not in conflict with each other– the first one claims that “desired
lifestyles” are relatively similar across income groups (of course one assumes on that several such “lifestyles”
coexist at any t). The second proposition holds that as one goes from one income cohort to a higher one,
the dispersion of actual consumption baskets will increase because under a relaxed budget constraint more
of those desired (and cross-sectionally diverse) ‘lifestyles’ will be satisfied.
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of studying analytically some generic invariances in the ensuing statistical properties.37
With respect to statistical follow-ups, what we have tried here are just a few and rather
naive attempts to check the coherence between the properties of the data generated by
the model and those observed in actual history. Ahead, there are obviously more rigorous
exploration of the robustness of the results (including Montecarlo-type exercises holding
parametrizations constant, and systematic comparisons across sample paths generated un-
der different parametrizations and behavioural assumptions). Moreover, one may envisage
– as mentioned earlier – promising interactions between analyses establishing parsimonious
sufficient statistical conditions for aggregate economic propositions to hold (such as those,
discussed above, proved by Hildebrand (1994) on notional “demand laws”) and explic-
itly microfounded models that might illuminate the classes of data-generating processes
yielding certain aggregate statistical outcomes.
As Veblen one century ago, an increasing number of scholars still feel today the impor-
tance of nesting the interpretation of economic phenomena upon microfoundations differ-
ent from coherent self-seeking monads with well-behaved “utility functions” and extraor-
dinary calculating capabilities. In this perspective, the foregoing work is hopefully moving
some modest steps forward in the direction of an evolutionary (and socially grounded)
theory of demand, still to come.
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